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Regulating or Reorganizing?: Depriving Federal 
Bankruptcy Courts of Their Statutory Authority and 
Misapplying Fundamental Tenets of Bankruptcy Law in 
In re Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 16, 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit deprived the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Louisiana of its jurisdiction authority over Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tions and misapplied "fundamental tenets of bankruptcy law."1 More 
specifically, the Fifth Circuit granted a state regulatory agency extraordi-
nary jurisdiction over Chapter 11 issues typically within the jurisdiction 
of a bankruptcy court2 and gave unusual application to the bankruptcy 
codes and case law governing the "breathing spell" granted to debtors 
under sections 502(b )(2) and 362 and the absolute priority rule under 
section 1129(b).3 
The Fifth Circuit justified its holding on two primary factors: the 
debtor in the case, Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., ("Cajun") is a 
billion dollar regulated utility with over seven hundred creditors;4 and the 
appellant, Louisiana Public Service Commission ("LPSC"), is the guard-
ian of the interest of Louisiana residents (i.e., public interest).5 This Note 
examines whether Fifth Circuit's analysis and justifications were suffi-
cient to warrant depriving the Bankruptcy Court of its jurisdictional au-
thority and the misapplication of fundamental tenants of bankruptcy law 
in In Re Cajun. Accordingly, Part II provides the background relating to 
a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction both over matters relating to bankruptcy 
and over the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, particularly in con-
trast to a state regulatory agency and administrative law judge. In addi-
tion, this section will set out the background of the "breathing spell" un-
Copyright © 2000 by Scott Kent Brown II. 
I. See In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., 185 F. 3d 446 (5th Cir. 1999). 
2. See Brief of Appellee Ralph R. Mabey, Chapter 11 Trustee for Cajun Electric Power Co-
operative, Inc., et. a!. at I, In Re Cajun, 185 F. 3d at 446 (No. 98-31258) (hereinafter "Brief of Ma-
bey") (on file with the author). 
3. See id. 
4. In re Cajun, 185 F. 3d at 448, 454. 
5. See id. at 454. 
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der sections 502(b )(2) and 362 and the absolute priority rule under sec-
tion 1129(b). Part III contains the facts of In re Cajun Electric Power 
Cooperative, Inc., and a short recitation of the court's reasoning. Finally, 
Part N analyzes the reasoning of the court. This Note concludes that the 
Fifth Circuit's justifications for its holding were not sufficient to warrant 
the court's unusual application of the bankruptcy law. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978 to enable 
reorganization of both solvent and insolvent entities.6 To ensure a suc-
cessful reorganization, bankruptcy courts were given the remarkable 
power to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or ap-
propriate" to enforce the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and exercise 
jurisdiction over all matters relating to the bankruptcy case.7 In addition, 
the Bankruptcy Code contains specific rules that govern the relationship 
between the debtor and its creditors and that are intended to grant the 
debtor a "breathing spell" from financial obligations owed to its credi-
tors. 8 Because the creditors of a debtor often have conflicting interests 
and claims, the Bankruptcy Code enforces the so-called "absolute prior-
ity rule."9 This rule prevents a junior class of creditors from leap-
frogging senior classes of creditors (unless the senior class of creditors 
agree) to obtain a greater distribution. 10 Since all of these rules play an 
important role in the analysis and holding of In Re Cajun, the back-
ground of each will be considered in tum. 
A. The Broad Power of the Bankruptcy Court 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e), "the district court in which a case under 
title 11 is commenced or pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all 
of the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement 
of such case, and of property of the estate."11 This broad jurisdictional 
grant to district courts is intended to centralize all proceedings related to 
the bankruptcy into one court. 12 The federal court's jurisdiction, how-
6. See WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY RULES PAMPHLET 1998-1999, 
963-72 ("Chapter II [enacted in the Reform Act of 1978] deals with the reorganization of a finan-
cially distressed business enterprise, providing for its rehabilitation by adjustment of its debt obliga-
tions and equity interests.") (hereinafter "NORTON"). 
7. II U.S.C. § 105(a) (1999); see also infra Part !I.A. 
8. See II U.S.C. § 362(a) (1999). 
9. See II U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1999). 
10. See id. 
II. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (1999). 
12. See Sunshine Dev. Inc. v. FDIC, 33 F.3d 106, 114 (1st Cir. 1994); Stem v. Massachu-
setts, 183 B.R. 42, 354 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995). 
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ever, is not absolute. For example, state law can exercise authority over 
the debtor's property, such as property taxes, state licensing requirements 
and state environmental law requirements. 13 In addition, the state can ex-
ercise "traditional ratemaking" authority over public utilities in Chapter 
11,14 as discussed in Part II.B.1 below. The state's authority, however, is 
not limitless and may be restricted by the bankruptcy court if used to 
substantially impede the rights of other, more senior creditors. 
To ensure the centralization of the bankruptcy proceeding, Congress 
has given bankruptcy courts power, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §105(a), to 
"issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to 
carry out the provisions of this title." 15 One equitable remedy available 
under section 105( a) is an injunction. 16 For a court to issue an injunction, 
the debtor must show that it will otherwise suffer irreparable harm. 17 
Once the bankruptcy court issues the injunction, it will be reviewed only 
for an abuse of discretion. 18 Thus, Congress has given bankruptcy courts 
not only original jurisdiction over the debtor's property but also flexibil-
ity as to the disposition of that property. 
B. The Breathing Spell 
The purpose of Chapter 11 is to reorganize "financially distressed" 
businesses by adjusting its "debt obligations and equity interest."19 The 
reorganization of the debtor would be impossible without allowing the 
debtor a "breathing spell" from its creditors and debts. This "breathing 
spell" takes many forms under the Bankruptcy Code and often remains in 
force until the debtor's plan of reorganization has been confirmed by the 
bankruptcy court or the debtor has been liquidated. Pertinent to this Note 
are two "breathing spell" rules: section 362(a) and section 502(b)(2). 
13. See In re Steffan, 97 B.R. 741,745 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989). 
14. See, e.g., II U.S.C. § 1129(a)(6). 
15. II U.S.C. § 105(a) (1999). 
16. See, e.g., NORTON, supra note 6, at 95-97 (citing numerous examples of cases of bank-
ruptcy courts using their injunctive powers). 
17. See, e.g., In re Heiney, 858 F.2d 548, 20 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 5 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(Bankruptcy Court has the power to enjoin if there is no adequate remedy of law and if there is a 
showing of irreparable injury if equitable relief is denied.); see also In re Cajun, 185 F. 3d at 455. 
18. See Indian Motorcycle Assocs. III Ltd. Partnership v. Massachusetts Hous. Fin. Agency, 
66 F.3d 1246, 1249 (1st Cir. 1995) ("A bankruptcy court's decision granting or denying injunctive 
relief pursuant to Bankruptcy Code§ 105(a) is reviewed only for abuse of discretion."); Common-
wealth Oil Refining Co. v. United States EPA (Matter of Commonwealth Oil Refining Co.), 805 
F.2d 1175, 1188 (5th Cir. 1986) (reviewing bankruptcy court's refusal to grant stay under § 105(a) 
for abuse of discretion); Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 341 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that 
a court abuses its discretion in granting injunctive relief when it "relies on erroneous conclusions of 
law, or ... misapplies its factual or legal conclusions"). 
19. NORTON, supra note 6, at 963. 
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1. The automatic stay under section 362(a) 
When the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, the House Report 
said about 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1): 
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections pro-
vided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from 
his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all fore-
closure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or organi-
zation plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that 
drove him into bankruptcy .... The automatic stay also provides credi-
tor protection. Without it, certain creditors would be able to pursue 
their own remedies against the debtor's property .... Bankruptcy is de-
signed to provide an orderly liquidation procedure under which all 
creditors are created equally .... Subsection (a) defines the scope of 
the automatic stay, by listing the acts that are stayed by the com-
mencement of the case .... The scope of the paragraph is broad. All 
proceedings are stayed, including arbitration, license revocation, ad-
ministrative, and judicial proceedings.20 
There are, however, exceptions to the automatic stay. One of these, 
found in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), allows "the commencement or continua-
tion of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit ... to enforce 
such government unit's ... police and regulatory power."21 The applica-
tion of this section was recently discussed in Board of Governors, FRS v. 
MCORP Financial, Inc. 22 The MCORP court held that the automatic stay 
did not authorize the district court to enjoin "ongoing, nonfinal adminis-
trative proceedings."23 To hold otherwise, the court opined, would "ren-
der subsection (b)(4)'s exception almost meaningless."24 
Supportive of the section 362(b)(4) exception is 11 U.S.C. § 
1129(a)(6). Section 1129(a)(6) provides that the court cannot approve a 
Chapter 11 plan unless, "[a]ny governmental regulatory commission with 
20. /d. at 267-68 (emphasis added). 
21. !d.; see also In re Cajun, 185 F.3d at 457. The House Report adds: 
Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, 
environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory 
laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is 
not stayed under the stay. 
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 563, 6296-97. In addi-
tion, the Congressional Record Statements provide: 
This section is intended to be given a narrow construction in order to permit governmen-
tal units to pursue actions to protect the public health and safety and not to apply to ac-
tions by a governmental unit to protect a pecuniary interest in property of the debtor or 
property of the estate. 
NORTON, supra note 6, at 269. 
22. 502 U.S. 32 (1991). 
23. /d. at 41. 
24. /d. 
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jurisdiction, after confirmation of the plan, over the rates of the debtor 
has approved any rate change provided for in the plan, or such rate 
change is expressly conditioned on such approval."25 This section has 
been interpreted as giving regulatory commissions "traditional" rate-
making power while the regulated entity is still undergoing reorganiza-
tion under Chapter 11.26 
The police and regulatory power exception of section 362(b)(4) does 
not mean a bankruptcy court is powerless to enjoin such an action or 
proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).27 Indeed, "significant authority" 
permits a court to enjoin a section 362(b)(4) action.28 For example, in 
Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, the Fifth Circuit found that although a court's power was 
not unlimited under section 105, "[c]ourts considering the scope of sec-
tion 105 have seen it as an avenue available for staying actions that are 
found to fall within an exception to the automatic stay."29 In Browning v. 
Navarro, the Fifth Circuit also held that "[a] bankruptcy court has the 
power to enjoin proceedings excepted from a§ 362 stay under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 105."30 In the case In re Javens v. City of Hazel Park, the Sixth Circuit 
held that "[b ]y creating exceptions for police and regulatory actions, 
'Congress removed local regulation only from the effect of the automatic 
stay; it did not eliminate the bankruptcy court's power to enjoin the en-
forcement of local regulation which is shown to be used in bad faith."' 31 
25. II U.S.C. § 1129(a)(6) (1999). 
26. See In re Cajun, 185 F.3d at 451-52, 453; see also Frank P. Darr, Federal-State Comity in 
Utility Bankruptcies, 27 AM. Bus. L. J. 63, 98-90 ( 1989) (arguing that section 1129(a)(6) "suggests 
that the commission retains significant authority to govern rates throughout the bankruptcy .... [A] 
regulatory commission retains its traditional control over rates prior to the finalization of the plan."). 
27. See In re Cajun, 185 F.3d at 452-53; see also 11 U.S.C. § 105, discussed at infra Part 
II. A. As one of the appellees points out: 
Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code imposes an automatic stay applicable to the 
LPSC and protects property of the Debtor's estates. The LPSC asserts that the recent 
amendment of Section 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code evidences a Congressional in-
tent to allow governmental agencies to obtain property of the estate without implicating 
the automatic stay. If that interpretation is true, then the necessity and wisdom of the 
lower courts injunction is evident; it prevents the wholesale destruction of the bankruptcy 
system by allowing state agencies carte blanche to take estate property and distribute it 
according to principles in clear derogation of bankruptcy law. Newly amended 362(b)(4), 
however, may be read more narrowly than prior to its amendment if it only applies to 
governmental units exercising authority under the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons-a reading which is not un-
reasonable. 
Brief of Mabey, supra note 2, at 34 n.23. 
28. See In re Cajun, 185 F.3d at 457 n.I8. 
29. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. United States EPA (In re Commonwealth Oil Refin-
ing Co.), 805 F.2d 1175, 1188 n.16 (5th Cir. 1986). 
30. 743 F.2d 1069, 1084 (5th Cir. 1984). 
31. I 07 F. 3d 359, 366 (6th Cir. 1997). 
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The First Circuit held that "a bankruptcy court does possess the power, in 
exceptional circumstances, to enjoin even administrative proceedings 
that are exempt from the automatic stay pursuant to section 364(b)(4), 
(5)."32 
2. Interest quandary under§ 502(b)(2) 
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2), claims for interest unmatured as 
of the time of the bankruptcy filing are disallowed.33 The rationale be-
hind section 502(b )(2) was stated as early as 1946: 
Exaction of interest, where the power of a debtor to pay even his con-
tractual obligations is suspended by law, has been prohibited because it 
was considered in the nature of a penalty imposed because of delay in 
prompt payment-a delay necessitated by law if the courts are properly 
to preserve and protect the estate for the benefit of all interests in-
volved?4 
This rationale is reiterated in the legislative history to section 502(b) 
which states that bankruptcy filing stops interest from accruing on any 
prepetition debt.35 Nevertheless, in cases such as In re Johnson, courts 
have held that creditors may continue to accrue postpetition interest on 
non-dischargeable debts.36 Additionally, any interest that matures post-
petition is only discharged if and when the debtor is discharged from 
bankruptcy. 37 
Because section 502(b )(2) only provides temporary relief for the 
debtor from interest payments, which may or may not later be dis-
charged, this rule acts very much like an automatic stay or "breathing 
spell" against postpetition interest until the debtor is either discharged or 
liquidated. In this manner the debtor is able to use the funds it would 
have otherwise had to pay for postpetition interest and apply it towards 
administrative and reorganizational costs and the payment of pre-petition 
debt. More importantly, however, the debtor's interest payments can 
amount to millions of dollars, the payment of which during bankruptcy 
may deprive both the debtor of much needed funds to facilitate reorgani-
zation and the unsecured creditor of equal treatment. 38 
32. Corporacion de Servicios Medicos Hospitalarios de Fajardo v. Mora, 805 F.2d 440, 449 
n.l4(lstCir.l986). 
33. See II U.S.C. § 502(b)(2). 
34. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 163 (1946). 
35. See NORTON, supra note 6, at 404. 
36. See In re Johnson, 146 F.3d 252, 260 (5th Cir. 1998). 
37. See II U.S.C. §§ 727(b), 114l(d); see also In Re Cajun, 185 F.3d at 455. 
38. See, e.g., In re Fesco Plastics Corp. 996 F.2d 152, 155 (7th Cir. 1993) (section 502(b)(2) 
furthers the fresh start by "saving the estate" from "having to pay extra for the delay in payment 
when that delay is necessary if the courts are to preserve and protect the estate for the benefit of all 
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C. The Absolute Priority Rule 
Predating the Bankruptcy Code, the absolute priority rule was gener-
ally formulated as follows: "fairness and equity require[] that 'the credi-
tors ... be paid before the stockholders could retain [equity interest] for 
any purpose whatever."39 The absolute priority rule has since been codi-
fied in the Bankruptcy Code.40 The primary purpose of the absolute pri-
ority rule is to ensure that "no junior class of unsecured creditors or eq-
uity holders may receive or retain any property or value on account of 
that junior claim or interest unless senior classes of claims or interests 
consent or are paid in full."41 Thus, the absolute priority rule protects 
senior creditors from being leap-frogged by junior creditors, trying to 
share in the pie before the crumbs are gone. 42 
At the bottom of the senior-junior line-up of creditors are the equity 
holders of the debtor. These creditors are the ones that stood to gain the 
most from the now bankrupt entity and, simultaneously, stood to lose the 
most if the business failed. Generally, in bankruptcy plans equity holders 
are paid only a few cents on the dollar and are never paid a penny until 
both senior and junior claim holders are paid in full, or otherwise con-
sent.43 
Ill. IN RE CAJUN ELECTRIC POWER COOPERATIVE, INC. 
A. The Facts 
On December 21, 1994, Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., 
filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
creditors"); In re Morrissey, 39 B.R. 571, 573 (Bankr. E. D. Va. 1984) ("to foster the policy of pro-
viding debtor with a fresh start, the general rule is that unmatured interest ... is not allowed as part 
of a claim against the debtor's estate."). 
39. Bank of America v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 526 U.S. 434, 119 S.Ct. 1411, 1417, 
143 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1999) (quoting Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482,508,33 S.Ct. 554, 
562, 57 L. Ed. 931 (1913)). 
/d. 
40. See II U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). The Code reads: 
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a [reorganization] plan be fair 
and equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements: 
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims-
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such class will notre-
ceive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any property. 
41. John M. Czametzky, Time, Uncertainty, and the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 60 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2939,2994 (1999) (citations omitted). 
42. See id. at 2996. 
43. See generally II U.S.C. § 1129(b). 
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Code.44 Cajun generates and sells electricity to twelve electric distribu-
tion cooperatives ("Members"-the equivalent of equity holders in a 
corporation) and others at wholesale rates.45 These Members and cus-
tomers in tum sell the electric power to retail consumers in Louisiana and 
elsewhere.46 At the time Cajun filed for reorganization, it was more than 
four billion dollars in debt and had over seven hundred creditors.47 Over 
four billion dollars of Cajun's debt was owed to the Rural Utilities Ser-
vice of the United States Department of Agriculture (RUS).48 
Two years after Cajun filed for reorganization, on January 23, 1996, 
the Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC), the administrative 
agency that sets Cajun's wholesale rates,49 "reopened a rate investigation 
of Cajun."50 The LPSC decided to reduce Cajun's rates by $48,437,462 
per year, '"because Cajun is not paying or accruing interest on its under-
lying debt during the pendency of its bankruptcy proceeding. "'51 In addi-
tion, the LPSC required that the "interest expense component of Cajun's 
rates be collected subject to refund, pending a determination by the bank-
ruptcy court concerning Cajun's interest expense liability during bank-
ruptcy ."52 
The Chapter 11 bankruptcy trustee for Cajun, Ralph Mabey (Mabey), 
filed an injunctive and a declaratory relief suit in the United Stated Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Middle District of Louisiana on September 11, 
1996.53 Mabey's request for a preliminary injunction was denied, and the 
LPSC required Cajun to place its "interest-expense" proceeds in escrow 
eventually to be refunded to the consumers. 54 On April2, 1998, the bank-
ruptcy court addressed Mabey's request for a permanent injunction and 
enjoined LPSC from considering 
any argument that [Cajun's] wholesale rate to its [M]embers should be 
lowered during this proceeding based solely upon the suspension of 
44. See In re Cajun, 185 F.3d at 448 n.l (citing Mabey v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co. (In 
re Cajun Elec. Power Coop.), !50 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1144 (1999); 
Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors v. Cajun Elec. Power Coop. (In re Cajun Elec. Power 
Coop.), 109 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 1997); Cajun Elec. Power Coop. v. Central La. Elec. Coop. (In re 
Cajun Elec. Power Coop.), 74 F. 3d 599 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
45. See In re Cajun, 185 F. 3d at 448. 
46. See id. 
47. See id. 
48. See id. at 449. 
49. See id.; see also LA. CONST. art. N, § 21; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:1163 (West 1999). 
50. In re Cajun, 185 F.3d at 449. 
51. !d. (quoting Ex parte Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. U-17735-F, 1996 WL 875336, 
at *4, 1996 PUC LEX IS 70, at *2, *9-* 10 (Oct. 16, 1996)). 
52. /d. 
53. See id. 
54. See id. at 450. 
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debt service occasioned by the filing of this proceeding, and ruled that 
Cajun's wholesale rates to its [m]embers may not be reduced during 
this proceeding where such reduction is based solely upon the filing of 
this case. 55 
257 
The escrow terminated in April of 1998.56 The United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Louisiana affirmed the bankruptcy court 
on October 1, 1998.57 Ten months later, on August 16, 1999, the United 
States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, reversed the District Court and 
held that the issuance of an injunction and termination of the escrow con-
stituted an abuse of the bankruptcy court's discretion. 58 
B. The Fifth Circuit Court's Reasoning 
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by establishing that both the 
LPSC and Mabey agreed that "Cajun is a regulated utility and that the 
LPSC has an obligation under state law to protect the public interest,"59 
but disagreed "as to whether a public utility commission may properly 
consider one of the effects of bankruptcy in setting a debtor utility's 
rates."60 In order to resolve the issue of what a public utility commission 
may or may not consider in setting the utility rates of a debtor under 
Chapter 11, the Fifth Circuit turned its attention to three determinative 
issues: (1) whether the "bankruptcy court's conclusion that interest con-
tinues to 'accrue' postpetition and that Cajun's interest obligation termi-
nates only if the bankruptcy court grants a discharge" warrants "the in-
junction that it entered in this appeal";61 (2) whether "fundamental" of 
bankruptcy law (i.e., the "breathing spell" under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) 
and 11 U.S.C. § 362, and the absolute priority rule) "provide a proper ba-
sis for the bankruptcy court to exercise any discretion that it may have 
under § 105(a) by enjoining the LPSC's consideration of the proper im-
pact of the suspension of Cajun's interest obligation on its wholesale 
rates and terminating the escrow provision in the LPSC's rate order";62 
and (3) whether the "bankruptcy court's assertion that the principles of 
the absolute priority rule 'permeate the entire chapter 11 case' and that 
any rate reduction would 'elevate' the [M]embers' equitable interests 
55. /d. 
56. See id. at 451. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. 
59. /d. at 454. 
60. /d. 
61. !d. at 455. 
62. !d. at 456-57. 
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over the interests of creditors is similarly insufficient to justify the in-
junction that the court entered."63 
With regard to the first issue of Cajun's interest obligation, the Fifth 
Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court that "a debtor's obligation with 
respect to postpetition interest terminates only 'if and when' the debtor 
obtains a discharge from the bankruptcy court."64 But, the court did not 
understand why "an injunction was necessary to carry out the provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Code."65 Indeed, the court could see "no meaningful 
difference" between the bankruptcy court's original denial of Mabey's 
request for a preliminary injunction with regards to the net and the es-
crow established by the LPSC's rate order.66 Thus, the court held that be-
cause the LPSC's amended rate order did not make a "final disposition of 
the contested interest expense component," the bankruptcy court's in-
. . d 67 JUnctiOn was not warrante . 
The Fifth Circuit then turned to the issue of whether the "fundamen-
tal" tenets of bankruptcy law gave the bankruptcy court discretion under 
section 105(a) to issue the injunction. Referring to section 502(b)(2), the 
court reasoned that although the suspension of debt service may enable a 
debtor to pay for its current operating expenses and administrative costs, 
it could find no support for Mabey's "claim that § 502(b)(2) is intended 
to provide the debtor, a regulated public utility, an unfettered right, vis-a-
vis Louisiana consumers, to build up money to give to its undersecured 
and unsecured creditors."68 Furthermore, with regards to Mabey's 
"breathing spell" argument under both section 502(b)(2) and section 
362(a), the court held that the LPSC was a "government unit" exempt 
from the "breathing spell" under section 362(b)(4).69 Therefore, the court 
held, "[b]ecause [Mabey] do[es] not argue that the rate-making proceed-
ing at issue in this appeal falls within the automatic stay provided by § 
362( a) or else outside the exception to stay provided by § 362(b )( 4 ), the 
injunction cannot properly rest on the 'breathing spell' afforded by § 
362(a)."70 
Finally, the court addressed the issue of the absolute priority rule. 
The court said that the fact that the "rate reduction would 'elevate' the 
[M]embers' equitable interests over the interests of creditors" was insuf-
63. !d. at 458 (citations omitted). 
64. !d. at 455. 
65. !d. 
66. See id. 
67. /d. 
68. !d. at 457 (emphasis in original). 
69. See id. 
70. !d. 
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ficient "to justify the injunction." 71 The court justified its reasoning be-
cause LPSC' s rate order explicitly provided that all amounts from the es-
crow would be refunded to the consumers.72 
IV. ANALYSIS 
This Note disagrees with the Fifth Circuit's analysis and conclusion. 
According to the Fifth Circuit, the primary issue in the case concerns 
"whether a public utility commission may properly consider one of the 
effects of bankruptcy in setting a debtor utility's rates."73 The court then 
proceeded to analyze this issue by asking whether the bankruptcy court 
abused its discretion by enjoining the public utility commission from 
making such a consideration.74 The court, applying the points of law dis-
cussed above, held that the bankruptcy court did abuse its discretion.75 
The Fifth Circuit analyzed the issues and reached its conclusion, 
"[k]eeping in mind the role of the LPSC as a guardian of the public inter-
est and Cajun as a regulated utility."76 
This Note's analysis begins by placing the Fifth Circuit's statement 
of the primary issue into context. This Note will then demonstrate that 
the court improperly deprived the bankruptcy court of its jurisdictional 
authority. Next, this Note will argue that the court wrongly applied "fun-
damental tenants of bankruptcy law": the "breathing spell" and the "ab-
solute priority rule." Finally, this Note asserts that it was not proper for 
the court to treat this Chapter 11 case differently from other cases be-
cause the LPSC was a "guardian of the public interest" and Cajun was a 
regulated utility. 
A. The Court's Primary Issue in Proper Context 
The court's statement of the primary issue of the case is oversimpli-
fied and does not set up a proper analysis of the sub-issues. The court's 
statement of the issue declares merely that the LPSC had considered 
"one of the effects of bankruptcy in setting a debtor utility's rates.'m But, 
perhaps not surprisingly, the court did not say: (1) what the "one" effect 
was that the LPSC considered in setting Cajun's utility rates; and (2) that 
based solely on this "one" effect (i.e., Cajun was in bankruptcy), the 
LPSC decided to reduce Cajun's rate's 19% (or approximately 
71. /d. at 458 (citations omitted). 
72. See id. 
73. !d. at 454. 
74. See id. at 453. 
75. See id. 
76. !d. at 454. 
77. !d. at 454. 
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$48,000,000 per year). As will be discussed below, by permitting the 
LPSC to reduce Cajun's rates because Cajun was in Chapter 11 the court 
violates the Bankruptcy Code, including the bankruptcy court's exclusive 
jurisdiction over the debtor's property. 
Returning to the Fifth Circuit's decision, there was little argument 
that the LPSC had the authority to reduce or increase Cajun's rates under 
their "traditional ratemaking authority."78 Indeed, prior to the present 
case, the LPSC reopened Cajun's "rate docket"79 and exercised its tradi-
tional authority several times by reducing Cajun's average wholesale 
electric rates to Members. 80 These rate proceedings and subsequent re-
ductions of Cajun's rates were initially challenged by Mabey, Cajun's 
Chapter 11 trustee. The bankruptcy court, however, held that "LPSC re-
tained 'traditional' ratemaking authority over Cajun's rates during the 
pendency of Cajun's Chapter 11 proceedings."81 But, the court added 
"that it would continue to monitor the rate docket for 'particular prob-
lems that may result from the conduct of the rate docket' and that the 
court would continue 'to be interested in what's taking place insofar as 
the rate docket is concerned. "'82 Soon thereafter, the bankruptcy court's 
interest perked up. 
On October 29, 1996, LPSC ordered a third reduction of Cajun's 
revenues from Member rates. 83 In contrast to the two previous reductions 
ordered by the LPSC (8% and 3%), this reduction was 19% (or 
$48,437,462 in annual revenues). In addition to this large reduction, the 
rate reduction was "based solely upon the post-filing suspension of Ca-
jun's debt service obligation pursuant to [section 502(b)(2) of] the Bank-
ruptcy Code."84 When the issue reached the bankruptcy court, the court 
held that the LPSC could not base a rate reduction solely on the fact that 
Cajun was operating under Chapter 11.85 
The LPSC conceded that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over 
the legal issue of Cajun's debt service obligation.86 But the LPSC main-
tained that it continued to have authority to "order the rate reduction."87 
78. Joint Brief of Appellees U.S. Department of Agriculture, Rural Utilities Service, and the 
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. at 7-8, In re 
Cajun, 185 F. 3d at 446 (No. 98-31258) (hereinafter "Joint Brief of RUS & UCC") (citing Transcript 
10/1/98, p. 111.21 top. 121.12; D. Ct. Rec. Vol. 2) (on file with author). 
79. See id. at 6. 
80. See id. at 7-8. 
81. /d. at7. 
82. /d. 
83. See id. at 8. 
84. /d. 
85. See id. at 5. 
86. See id. at 10. 
87. !d. 
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Thus, the LPSC allowed Cajun to collect, but escrow, the $48,437,462 
annual interest expense pending the bankruptcy court's determination of 
the debt service obligation.88 
The Fifth Circuit concluded that "[b]ecause the LPSC's amended 
rate order merely sets aside and does not purport to make a final disposi-
tion of the contested interest expense component, the bankruptcy court's 
conclusion that interest continues to 'accrue' postpetition and that Ca-
jun's interest obligation terminates only if the bankruptcy court grants a 
discharge does not warrant the injunction that it entered in this appeal."89 
The court reached this conclusion because it saw "no meaningful differ-
ence" between the escrow LPSC wanted to establish for Cajun's equity 
holders (Member/ratepayers) and a potential bankruptcy court decision, 
under section 502(b)(2) at the end of the bankruptcy, that Cajun would 
owe the Members any interest that had accrued during the Chapter 11 
d. 90 procee mgs. 
The differences between the two possibilities, however, are both ob-
vious and very meaningful. The first meaningful difference is that the 
Fifth Circuit's decision gives the LPSC authority to exercise substantial 
control over Cajun's property that is strictly under the jurisdiction of the 
bankruptcy court. Second, giving the LPSC authority to control Cajun's 
property deprives Cajun of the "breathing spell" granted to all debtors 
under Chapter 11. Third, allowing the LPSC to dispose of the property 
through an escrow, with the intention to refund it to the Members and 
eventually the consumers, violates the absolute priority rule under sec-
tion 1129(b). Finally, permitting the LPSC to exercise control over Ca-
jun's property is not warranted simply because the LPSC is "guardian of 
the public interest." Moreover, this line of analysis ignores the bank-
ruptcy court's jurisdictional authority and the "fundamental tenets" of 
bankruptcy law. 
B. The Jurisdictional Authority of the Bankruptcy Court 
The Fifth Circuit stated that it could "see no meaningful difference" 
between a bankruptcy court, at the end of bankruptcy, ordering the 
debtor to repay post-petition interest on debts (under section 502(b)(2)) 
and LPSC' s escrow established by the rate order.91 Even before the mer-
its of this statement are reached, there is an important, underlying prob-
lem that the Fifth Circuit overlooked. By asserting that there is no mean-
88. Debt service obligations, as discussed above, are almost always discharged, but not until 
the end of bankruptcy. See supra Part II.B.2. 
89. In re Cajun, 185 F.3d at 455. 
90. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
91. See In re Cajun, 185 F. 3d at 455. 
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ingful difference between a bankruptcy court's decision under the Bank-
ruptcy Code and the LPSC' s decision interpreting the Bankruptcy Code 
(because both decisions potentially have the same effect), the Fifth Cir-
cuit is asserting that the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code by the 
LPSC, a state regulatory agency, is just as authoritative as a bankruptcy 
court's. Certainly there is a huge difference between how these two enti-
ties interpret and apply the Bankruptcy Code. 
The Fifth Circuit relies on sections 362(b)(4) and section 1129(a)(6) 
to support its conclusion that the LPSC can reduce Cajun's rate by 
19%.92 The extent of a regulatory commission's control over a Chapter 
11 debtor's property under the section 362(b)(4) exception was ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court in Board of Governors, FRS v. MCORP 
Financial, Inc, a case not discussed by the Fifth Circuit.93 As stated 
above, the MCORP court held that the "automatic stay provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code [do not] have any application to ongoing, nonfinal ad-
ministrative proceedings."94 But, concerning the administrative proceed-
ings, the court stated: 
It is possible, of course, that the Board [regulatory agency] proceed-
ings, like many other enforcement actions, may conclude with the entry 
of an order that will affect the Bankruptcy Court's control over the 
property of the estate, but that possibility cannot be sufficient to justify 
the operation of the stay against an enforcement proceeding that is ex-
pressly exempted by§ 362(b)(4) .... If and when the Board's proceed-
ings culminate in a final order, and if and when judicial proceedings are 
commenced to enforce such an order, then it may well be proper for the 
Bankruptcy Court to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction under 28 
95 U.S.C. § 1334(b). 
In Cajun the bankruptcy court followed the guidelines set by MCORP by 
not prohibiting the LPSC from exercising its "traditional" ratemaking au-
thority over Cajun. Furthermore, the bankruptcy court did not prohibit 
the LPSC from holding administrative proceedings on rate reductions 
while Cajun was in Chapter 11. But when the LPSC's rate reduction or-
der was put into force and Cajun was deprived of more than $48,000,000 
in annual assets, the bankruptcy court correctly saw that reduction as a 
threat to its "control" over Cajun's property96 and properly exercised its 
"concurrent jurisdiction" over the property. In other words, the applica-
92. See id. at 453. 
93. 502 u.s. 32, 39-41 (1991). 
94. See id. at 41. 
95. !d. (emphasis in original). 
96. See In rePublic Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 108 B.R. 854, 891 (Bankr. D.N.H 1989) 
(In a utility bankruptcy case, the debtor's value is determined primarily by the rates it can charge.). 
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tion of MCORP demonstrates that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its 
discretion by enjoining the LPSC from siphoning a substantial portion of 
Cajun's assets from secured creditors to unsecured creditors. More im-
portantly, however, the MCORP decision clearly showed that there can 
be a "meaningful difference" between a regulatory agency's control over 
the debtor's property and the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. 
Finally, the LPSC's "traditional ratemaking" authority does not in-
clude interpreting and applying bankruptcy law and appropriating inter-
est assets for equity holders (Members).97 The LPSC's escrow rate order 
far exceeds its "traditional ratemaking principles" because the "interest 
suspension" afforded a Chapter 11 debtor is based solely on (1) the 
debtor's filing of a Chapter 11 petition and (2) section 502(b )(2) of the 
Bankruptcy Code,98 and not on a state regulatory agency's interpretation 
of the Bankruptcy Code. Similarly, the LPSC reduced Cajun's rates be-
cause "the record in this proceeding supports a finding that Cajun's in-
terest expense should be excluded from its rates for the reason that Ca-
jun's debt service obligation has been suspended during the pendency of 
its bankruptcy."99 From this statement it is evident that the LPSC's sole 
justification for reducing Cajun's rates were based on a specific provi-
sion of the Bankruptcy Code - 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2). Therefore, the 
LPSC' s action can hardly be justified as "traditional" and clearly falls 
within the jurisdictional authority of the bankruptcy court. 100 
C. The Interest Quandary and the "Breathing Spell" 
The Fifth Circuit treated the "interest" issue under section 502(b )(2) 
separately from the "breathing spell" issues, also involving section 
502(b)(2). 101 This was presumably done because appellees argued that 
section 502(b )(2) was the proper mechanism for dealing with the interest 
accruing on Cajun's debts, as opposed to the LPSC's escrow, and the 
postponement under section 502(b )(2)' s of the debtor's obligation to pay 
interest on this debt provides a "breathing spell" for the debtor. 102 This 
Note's analysis will do the same, even though the issues under the two 
arguments overlap. 
97. See Joint Brief ofRUS & vee, supra note 78, at 14 n.ll. 
98. See id. at 18. 
99. !d. at 19. 
100. Appellees RUS and vee provide a nice example of how the LPSe traditionally sets 
rates. See id. at 18-19. 
101. See In re Cajun, 185 F.3d at 456. 
102. See id. at 454-58. 
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1. Adoption of the LPSC's position would result in a distribution of 
estate assets contrary to the express statutory provisions of§ 502(b)(2) 
of the Bankruptcy Code103 
The LPSC reduced Cajun's rate and set up the escrow because it be-
lieved, under section 502(b )(2), that the interest Cajun owed on its debts 
to the Members ceased to accrue when Cajun filed bankruptcy. 104 This 
belief is incorrect. Under section 502(b )(2), "postpetition interest contin-
ues to accrue until discharge" even if interest may be allowable only on 
an oversecured claim.105 Indeed, according to section 502(b )(2), a credi-
tor's interest claims are not simply cut off when the debtor files for bank-
ruptcy.106 This principle was upheld in In re Johnson, when the Fifth Cir-
cuit (this court) held that creditors can continue to accrue postpetition 
interest on non-dischargeable debts. 107 In addition, a bankruptcy com-
mentator noted: 
Section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code prescribes the grounds for 
objecting to claims in a title 11 case. By itself, it does not change the 
legal rights of the holder of an obligation against the debtor. There is no 
discharge. Put another way, the general rule in title 11 cases that there 
is no accrual of postpetition interest is a rule of convenience governing 
distributions [i.e., the allowance/disallowance issue] to creditors. It is 
not a rule of substantive law that converts an interest bearing indebted-
ness to an nonenforceable, non-interest-bearing indebtedness. 108 
On appeal LPSC cited In re Wabash in order to support its proposi-
tion that the escrow ordered was appropriate and that interest on the 
Member's debt was not owed for the postpetition period. 109 The Fifth 
Circuit, however, noted that Wabash 
did not involve a court's discretion to enjoin a public utility commis-
sion's consideration of a rate decrease based on the suspension of debt 
service or to terminate a commission's establishment of an escrow for 
such funds, and the decision therefore does not affect our resolution of 
h . . h' 1110 t at 1ssue m t 1s appea . 
103. See Joint Brief of RUS & UCC, supra note 78, at 21-22 n.14. 
104. See id. 
105. /d. at 21. 
106. See id. 
107. See In re Johnson, 146 F.2d 252, 260 (5th Cir. 1998). 
108. MYRON M. SHEINFELD ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 'fTX 15.05[3][a][i] at TX 15-
44 (15th ed. 1998). 
I 09. See In re Cajun, 185 F.3d at 452. 
110. ld. at 452 n.8. 
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Whether intentionally avoiding the consequences of Wabash or not, the 
Fifth Circuit quickly closed the door on a case in which a bankruptcy 
court had not abused its discretion by enjoining an escrow intended to 
benefit Cajun's unsecured creditors (i.e., the Members). 111 
In Wabash it was the debtor that contended its rates should be re-
duced.112 The court there, however, rejected the debtor's contention and 
ordered the funds that had been held in escrow to be paid over to REA 
(now RUS - same main secured creditor as this case) to reduce the 
principal of REA's debt. 113 The court in Wabash reasoned that it was 
"pointless to allow Wabash's rates to be adjusted downward due to the 
temporary suspension of its obligation to pay the debt."114 Therefore, just 
because Wabash did not officially address a bankruptcy court's discre-
tion to enjoin a public utility's rate decrease, Wabash certainly stands for 
the proposition that such an injunction would not have been an abuse of a 
bankruptcy court's discretion because such a rate reduction and escrow 
based on the temporary suspension to pay the debt is "pointless." 
2. The bankruptcy court's decision, not the LPSC's order, is "entirely 
consistent with the important 'breathing spell' that Congress provided to 
debtors under the Bankruptcy Code "115 
The Fifth Circuit made short work of the appellee's "breathing spell" 
arguments that were based on sections 502(b )(2) and 362(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. First, the Fifth Circuit held that section 502(b )(2) does not 
provide a breathing spell for Cajun, primarily because Cajun is a "regu-
lated public utility." 116 Second, the Fifth Circuit argued, there was a bet-
ter basis for claiming a breathing spell under section 362(a), but that sec-
tion didn't apply because LPSC was excepted from the automatic stay 
under sections 362(b)(4) and 1129(a)(6), discussed above. These argu-
ments will be considered together. 
The Fifth Circuit argued: 
Although the effect of suspending debt service may be to make it possi-
ble for the debtor to use income to pay its current operating expenses 
and the administrative expenses of the proceeding, we find no support 
for appellee's claim that § 502(b )(2) is intended to provide the debtor, a 
regulated public utility, an unfettered right, vis-a-vis Louisiana con-
Ill. See f?enerally In re Wabash Valley Power Ass'n, 72 F.3d 1305 (7th eir. 1995). 
112. See Joint Brief of RVS & vee, supra note 78, at 24; see also infra Part N.E. 
113. See Joint Brief of RVS & vee, supra note 78, at 24-25. 
114. /d. at 25. 
115. /d. at 15. 
116. See In re Cajun, 185 F. 3d at 457-58. 
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sumers, to build up money to give to its undersecured and unsecured 
creditors. 117 
The court makes the assumption that appellees have argued that Ca-
jun is entitled to a breathing spell under either section 502(b )(2) or sec-
tion 362(a). This assumption is incorrect. The appellees argued that sec-
tion 502(b)(2) combined with section 362(a) provide the debtor with a 
"breathing spell."118 This distinction is important because section 362(a) 
(subject to certain exceptions) prohibits the debtor's creditors from col-
lecting both the "principal" of their obligations and the prepetition inter-
est. Likewise, section 502(b )(2) postpones the accrual of postpetition 
debt on each creditor's claim.119 During the debtor's reorganization, the 
debtor benefits by not having to pay the principal and prepetition interest 
and by not having to make payments for postpetition debt service. 120 
These two benefits combine in a Chapter 11 case and allow the debtor an 
opportunity to compile funds that may be used for additional reorganiza-
tion purposes by making required payments in cash to the senior classes 
of creditors and other payments to junior classes of creditors to persuade 
h d. I f . . 121 t ese ere 1tors to approve a p an o reorgamzatwn. 
By denying Cajun the "breathing spell" provided under section 
362(a), combined with section 502(b)(2), the court has allowed the LPSC 
to: (1) disrupt the bankruptcy priority scheme; 122 (2) provide a windfall 
for the consumers; 123 and, (3) institute a "myopic and piecemeal setting 
of rates based upon select bankruptcy provisions."124 
a. Providing a windfall for consumers. Holding that the "breathing 
spell" does not apply here and thereby granting the consumers, through 
the Members, $48,000,000 of Cajun's assets per year provides the con-
sumers with a windfall. 125 In other words, the consumers receive a tre-
mendous amount of money refunded to them that they otherwise would 
not have been entitled to had Cajun not filed bankruptcy. Windfalls, 
however, through the "happenstance" of bankruptcy, are forbidden. 126 
117. /d.at457. 
118. See Joint Brief of RUS & vee, supra note 78, at 29; Brief of Mabey, supra note 2, at 36 
n.24. 
119. See Joint Brief of RUS & vee, supra note 78, at 27. 
120. See id. at 27. 
121. See Brief of Mabey, supra note 2, at 37. 
122. See id. at 38. This issue is discussed in this Note's "absolute priority rule" analysis. See 
supra Part IV.D. 
123. See Brief of Mabey, supra note 2, at 39-40. 
124. /d. at 40-41. 
125. See generally id. at 39-40. 
126. See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 763 (1992) (prohibiting windfalls to a party 
"merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy"). 
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Therefore, the "breathing spell" should have been enforced, thus prevent-
ing the consumers from receiving a windfall. 
b. Instituting a shortsighted and fragmented setting of rates. Although 
bankruptcy provides the debtor with tremendous relief, many costs are 
associated with a bankruptcy proceeding.127 Such costs include "adminis-
trative costs, professional fees, adequate protection awards, satisfaction 
of creditors by funding a plan of reorganization, and potential awards of 
interest based upon one of the exceptions to interest suspension."128 
Never did the LPSC raise Cajun's rates to compensate for these costs 
during its bankruptcy .129 By this the LPSC has demonstrated that it is ill-
equipped to view all costs and issues since it has only lowered Cajun's 
rates in favor of the Members and in disfavor of all other creditors. 130 
Thus, relying on the LPSC's one-sided disposition to view the bank-
ruptcy proceedings in favor of just one party would be detrimental to a 
f 1 ° 0 f c 0 131 success u reorgamzatton o aJun. 
D. The Absolute Priority Rule 
Underlying the issues involved in the Fifth Circuit's decision is the 
absolute priority rule. As mentioned above, the absolute priority rule, 
codified in section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), precludes a junior class of creditors 
from receiving property from the bankrupt's estate before the claims of 
the senior classes are satisfied. 132 The Fifth Circuit, however, said that 
the absolute priority rule was not violated when the LPSC decided to 
place Cajun's property in escrow, which was later to be refunded to the 
Members (i.e., equity holders). 133 The court based its conclusion on the 
fact that the LPSC' s rate order explicitly provided that all monies placed 
in the escrow account would be refunded to consumers. 134 
The Fifth Circuit misapplied the absolute priority rule. Just because 
the money was intended to be given eventually to "consumers" does not 
mean that the absolute priority rule has not been violated. Not surpris-
ingly, the court offers no support for this contention. 135 Instead, the court 
seems to think that because the money was ultimately being refunded to 
consumers, not Members, the Members' interests are not being placed in 
127. See Brief of Mabey, supra note 2, at 40. 
128. /d. 
129. See id. at 41. 
130. See id. 
131. See id. 
132. See II U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 
202 (1988). 
133. See In re Cajun, 185 F. 3d at 458. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. 
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front of more senior creditors. Technically this may be true. Substan-
tively it is not. The money is being refunded to the Members. 136 This is a 
violation of the absolute priority rule because the money is given to a 
junior class, the Members, before the claims of more senior classes have 
been satisfied. This violation is not diminished simply because Members 
are, in tum, obligated to refund the money to consumers. If anything, the 
absolute priority rule is violated even more because the money is in-
tended to go to neither creditors of Cajun nor parties to the action. Even 
the Members recognized this problem and withdrew their support for the 
LPSC's position in this appeal. 137 In sum, diverting $48,000,000 of Ca-
jun's property into escrow to be paid to Cajun's equity holders, before 
Cajun's secured creditors were paid in full and before the bankruptcy 
court could properly decide the fate of these monies, was clearly a viola-
tion of the absolute priority rule. 
E. The LPSC as a Public Guardian and Cajun as a Regulated Utility 
At the beginning of its analysis of the issues, the Fifth Circuit stated 
that it would view the issues in light of the fact that the LPSC was a 
guardian of the public interest and Cajun was a regulated utility. Examin-
ing the bankruptcy issues on these two factors above is insufficient to 
justify unprecedented interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code. Indeed, 
only once does the Bankruptcy Code suggest that these factors should 
make any difference in a bankruptcy proceeding. This exception was dis-
cussed above138 and concerns section 362(b)(4) - but it is doubtful 
whether this section would even apply to the LPSC under the current 
version of the code. Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor case law suggest 
that a regulated utility, regulated by guardian of the public interest, 
should be treated any differently from a normal Chapter 11 debtor. 
Substantial abuses could arise if regulated utilities and guardians of 
the public interest were treated differently from other Chapter 11 debtors. 
As one appellee explained, the Fifth Circuit's differentiation based on 
these factors is 
contrary to common sense and basic notions of equality. If the LPSC's 
approach were correct, an electric cooperative could immediately and 
136. See id. ("By the explicit terms of the amended rate order, 'all amounts refunded to the 
distribution cooperatives [Members] from the escrow account must be in tum refunded to consum-
ers."'). 
137. See Brief of Mabey, supra note 2, at 20-21 ("[T)he Members, the real parties in interest 
here, ... [argued] for immediate rate reductions and the retroactive imposition of the interest escrow. 
The Members have now agreed to the Trustee's position in this case and withdrawn their demands 
for rate reductions or the reinstatement of the escrow."). 
138. See supra note 21. 
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drastically reduce its rates, by a third or perhaps more, through the sim-
ple expediency of filing a bankruptcy petition. Such a holding would 
sabotage the RUS's lending program and jeopardize billions of dollars 
of taxpayer money. Moreover, ensuring that artificially reduced rates 
remain in effect for as long as the debtor continues in bankruptcy 
would eliminate any motivation to resolve bankruptcy actions. Under 
that scenario, the Members and the LPSC would have no incentive to 
ever support a plan and the longer they delay the case, the more equity 
and Member-ratepayers would benefit at creditors' expense. 139 
269 
Thus, the Fifth Circuit's different treatment of a regulated utility and a 
guardian of the public interest is supported by neither bankruptcy law nor 
common sense. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Fifth Circuit stripped the bankruptcy court of its jurisdiction and 
held that a state regulatory agency's interpretation was just as authorita-
tive as a bankruptcy court's interpretation. This is false. First, the state 
regulatory agency did not interpret the Bankruptcy Code correctly. Sec-
ond, decisions regarding where and how the assets of a debtor under 
Chapter II will be applied are solely within the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court. 
In addition to misconstruing the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, the 
Fifth Circuit misapplied "fundamental tenants of bankruptcy law": the 
breathing spell (including the "interest quandary" and "automatic stay") 
and the "absolute priority rule." These rules are designed to ensure a fair, 
uniform management and distribution of the debtor's assets during and 
after bankruptcy. Instead, under the Fifth Circuit's ruling, a state regula-
tory agency is able to withhold millions of dollars intended for the sur-
vival and proper reorganization of a debtor for the benefit of the lowest 
Members in the lowest class of a bankruptcy reorganization plan. Finally, 
these conclusions were incorrectly based on the fact that LPSC was a 
guardian of public interest and Cajun was a regulated utility. 
Scott Kent Brown II 
139. Joint Brief of RUS & UCC, supra note 78, at 32. 
